Human decides
- thesis and Brief spine
- architecture and policy
- provider and model authority
- canonical decisions
- editorial approval
- publication, deploy, and send
How a human governs a hybrid agentic intelligence system - and how the system turns weak signals into evidence-bounded, auditable outputs.
Real operating documentation. This page exposes the control model, component contracts, procedures, and failure rules. Secrets, credentials, private hostnames, internal session paths, and live system status are excluded.
SIGNIT is not a single autonomous agent. It is an artifact-driven intelligence system with a deliberate separation between human authority, agentic work, deterministic assurance, and external execution.
The pipeline accumulates signal without allowing accumulated signal to become truth by default. Agents widen sensing and create pressure; deterministic rails decide what can move; route memory decides where to look next; humans decide what the system may say or do.
Detailed system map Open the system architecture + agent blueprintSee runtime planes, component contracts, agent anatomy, evidence paths, and control gates.
System flow · six layers
Route memory · closed loop
Every task begins with an exact bind. Transient facts are read from current evidence, never hardcoded or reconstructed from conversational memory.
Task class is an execution boundary. A task never drifts into a more consequential class because the tools happen to be available.
| Mode | Purpose | Mutation boundary | Exit evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| READ_ONLY_REVIEW | Inspect exact repositories, artifacts, databases, and records. | No mutation. | Bound findings with source and freshness. |
| EDITORIAL_AUTHORING | Prepare human-controlled Brief or Audit Packet copy. | No publication or lifecycle advancement. | Reviewable draft bound to evidence. |
| BOUNDED_IMPLEMENTATION | Make path-scoped code or test changes from an exact work order. | No adjacent cleanup, commit, push, or deploy by implication. | Diff, focused tests, rollback proof. |
| ADVERSARIAL_AUDIT | Challenge architecture, assumptions, claims, and test gaps. | Read-only by default. | Supported findings and rejected hypotheses. |
| PUBLICATION_PREP | Build and validate one exact package; bind hashes and executor. | No push or deployment. | Manifest, preflight, authorization request. |
| PUBLICATION | Publish one exact, separately approved package. | One executor; no parallel path; no send authority by default. | Source commit, deployment receipt, live verification. |
| MANUAL_RECOVERY | Diagnose and recover a failed scheduled or external proof path. | Preserve evidence; use the narrowest reversible action. | Recovered proof, rollback path, incident record. |
May call approved providers and write production state. Runs only on the scheduled or explicitly authorized path.
Report-only validation of completed work. It does not rerun production agents or repair truth by mutation.
One authorized post-run writer. Manual graph or route edits are prohibited recovery shortcuts.
Occurs outside SIGNIT after a separate exact-package authorization. Deployment and subscriber send remain different proof classes.
A coherent narrative is not sufficient evidence. Every load-bearing claim must carry traceable provenance, survive verification and adversarial review, and be final-supported in the current run before it can support a Brief.
proposed assertion or finding
origin, retrieval context, dependencies
automated checks + structured validation
overclaim, mismatch, weakness, limits
supported, contested, caveat-only, non-final
cleared for human-controlled assembly
For eligible read-only reviews and adversarial audits, the Orchestration Agent uses a controlled multi-model harness rather than trusting one monolithic pass. Each specialist sees the same hashed source capsule, works independently, and returns evidence for orchestration-layer synthesis.
Agent analysis is evidence, not authority. Lanes cannot read sibling results, change source, mutate the canonical system, or convert consensus into truth. The Orchestration Agent rejects unsupported claims and independently checks load-bearing findings; the Human retains consequential authority.
mode: READ_ONLY_REVIEW | ADVERSARIAL_AUDIT model: Grok 4.5 High source: isolated exact source capsule sandbox: strict memory: off web: off subagents: off tools: read_file, grep, list_dir mutation: denied
Implementation agents receive a bounded work order with exact scope, inputs, constraints, expected artifacts, validation, and rollback. They may edit only authorized paths and return a diff plus proof. They do not inherit architecture, publication, merge, deployment, scheduler, or lifecycle authority.
SIGNIT prepares governed evidence and assurance artifacts; it does not author or publish the final Brief. Publication is a separately authorized control-plane action bound to one exact package and one executor.
Human selects the thesis and load-bearing argument.
Final-supported evidence and caveats.
Human-controlled narrative artifact prepared by the Orchestration Agent.
Claim, source, challenge, and signoff registers.
Exact package and public-safety checks.
Human approves content and presentation.
Approved human-controlled artifact recorded.
IDs, hashes, dates, and executor bound.
Human authorizes this exact package.
One bounded path; no parallel execution.
Public bytes, URL, source, and receipt.
Publication record and lifecycle update.
Separate run and delivery evidence.
Recovery starts by preserving evidence and binding the exact failure. The safe path is narrow, causal, reversible, and independently reverified.
| Trigger | Establish | Safe recovery | Stop condition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Source drift | Exact diff, owner, protected paths. | Commit intended path-scoped work or restore the accidental path through an approved reversible change. | Intent or owner is unknown. |
| Expected runtime output | Producer and registered output family. | Usually wait. Investigate only genuinely unexpected paths. | Path has no known producer. |
| Active runtime | Lock, process, run ID, scheduler window. | Wait for completion, then rerun stale-safe checks. | Any generated-surface commit or mirror attempt. |
| Missing exact-run proof | Missing sidecar or artifact bound to the run. | Let the natural producer emit it or debug that producer. | Manual state write would fabricate proof. |
| Finality conflict | Load-bearing claim, current source, precedence. | Hold readiness; strengthen, caveat, or remove the claim. | Publication remains blocked. |
| Mirror hash mismatch | Mapping, redaction, local and mirror hashes. | Run narrow inventory and path-scoped safe sync. | Redaction or authority is uncertain. |
| Package hash mismatch | Manifest against exact current public bytes. | Rebuild the package and obtain renewed approval. | No push or deployment under the old approval. |
| Deploy/live mismatch | Source commit, deployment receipt, final URL, live bytes. | Wait for propagation, then repair or roll back the exact causal path. | Do not claim publication complete. |
| Subscriber proof missing | Publication proof versus send/run receipt. | Use a separately authorized send investigation or recovery; report aggregates only. | Do not infer delivery from deployment. |
Use read-only diagnostics first. The canonical repository controls current paths, flags, and output contracts; these commands document the operating pattern and must be rechecked against the live code before use.
python scripts/check_signit_repository_integrity.py --no-writepython scripts/check_signit_operational_reachability.py --no-writepython scripts/build_signit_loop_board.py --no-writepython scripts/check_signit_stale_safe_surface.py --scope <path>python scripts/check_signit_remote_mirror.py --no-writeCommand names come from the documented operator diagnostics. They are intentionally shown without host paths, tokens, environment values, or private repository names.